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VIA: AIR

DISPATCH NO.

TO : Chief, KUCLUB

Date: 15 Dec 1953

FROM : Chief Communications,

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

SUBJ : General : Operational

Specific : Progress Report

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1. [] arrived in April, 1953 to assume duties as chief of [] the [] Joint Station. [] found that the original concept of the station had somewhat changed in that the location and size had been altered. Instead of a transmitter site some 8 miles away, containing only [] physical plant, it was decided to locate the Transmitter station in a large mansion close to the Guest House and to combine in it both [] and [] transmitter facilities, as well as the shops of Engineering and Maintenance and the Communications Supply section.

2. [] found that the Joint Station was so far based only upon broad generalities, with few specifics delineated or considered. It was not known how many circuits were to be handled from the station due to the delinquency of both [] in furnishing such data. As a result, the receiving site could not be planned, the operating building designed, nor antennas laid out. Both [] had previously expressed interest in the concept of a Joint Station, and contingent upon certain of their requirements for security, sharing of costs, and proportioning of responsibilities, appeared to be willing to work together in the same building. After long negotiation with [] some of the details of cost sharing were worked out, with [] furnishing all of the equipment, most of the construction costs, and any new buildings required. About the only item of expense to be borne by the other two organizations was that of food for their operators.

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3. During previous discussions of [] concerning the concepts and policy of the Joint Station, both [] agreed to work together in the same building and to cooperate with one another and with [] Since one objective of the Joint Station was to encourage [] and [] to work together and they had agreed to do so, the [] station was launched. In the Home Office design of the station, both receiving and transmitting facilities were common to all three organizations, following, of course, the concept that said organizations would indeed work together. In fact, [] brought some of the plans with him from the Home Office to [] with the understanding that the station plans would soon be implemented with the aid of a Home Office engineer who was to follow soon for that purpose.

4. [] who was then acting Chief Communications Officer, felt that it was unrealistic to plunge into a \$500,000 station on the basis of past experience with [] the lack of cooperation of [] and the few circuits it was suspected that each would place in the new station under American control. [] decided to start out with a small station and then, if both

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organizations showed a willingness to cooperate with [] and add more circuits, the small station could be expanded. Meanwhile, surplus [] equipment could be used to good advantage in conjunction with [] and added to [] if that station expanded. This was concurred in by KUCIUB and the decision was made to build the receiving station in the corner of the Guest House presently occupied by the [] transmitters. The Engineering and Maintenance shops, and Communications Supply. 25X1

5. This space was altered to provide a common operating room; separate code rooms, with an American code supervisor's room between them, and the Chief of Station's office. Meanwhile, [] furnished [] with a list of circuits which it expected would be worked out of []. It was found that the estimate by [] of the size the station should be was an accurate one, since not more than 2 or 3 positions would be required. After the receiving station had been altered in conformity with [] stipulations, the former sent a representative to look over the station. [] evinced no interest in the station. The representative from [] inspected the [] receiving site and declared that the layout put his organization into too close contact with [] and would not consider putting any circuits into the station with such a situation. This, of course, was in complete contradiction to the original agreements made by []. This required consultation of [] as to the advisability and feasibility of separating [] into two separate sites. 25X1

6. [] explained to [] the multiplication of difficulties in equipment and American personnel by operating a separate receiving station for each organization. It would entail separate keying lines, duplication of all receiving room equipment, and doubling of American supervisory personnel. It would cause many difficulties, and [] realized the problem and instructed the Communications Division to use the existing site solely for [] and not to consider [] since they had so far offered no cooperation whatsoever in setting up the station. He advised that the time they expressed a desire to come into the station would be time to meet that problem, and vouched an opinion that they would not so desire. Planning for the station then proceeded in accordance with this decision. [] became ill and was hospitalized for two weeks and was unable to proceed with work on the station. A day or two after he returned, a [] representative called in person and expressed great interest in the station. As well as a desire to move into it as soon as possible. This development, of course, returned the project to its previous state of difficulties, where it now halts for a solution to the problem. 25X1

7. Under the original concept, 8 American supervisory personnel were needed to maintain a 24 hour a day, 7 days a week watch. Close supervision is, of course, essential for complete American control of the station and its communications. Anything less would result in complete or partial loss of control. Which would be in violation of the objectives of the station's construction. Placing the two organizations in separate locations would double this requirement of necessary personnel. Returned field team operators will in part fill up requirements under the original concept of the station's set-up. Three or possibly four such operators were expected to be available when [] began operations. Since [] was the only man sent to [] under the [] T/O and it was not known when any more 25X1

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[] personnel would be sent, the problem of adequate supervision of the station was acute. One method of alleviating the situation somewhat, is to use one supervisor for both jobs of radio and crypt supervisor. This violates the original concept of the station which envisaged one radio supervisor and one crypt supervisor per shift, but no other solution is readily apparent.

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8. At the present time, progress on [] is halted until a solution is found to the refusal of [] to cooperate and work together. It is felt also that this refusal of cooperation will carry over to the transmitting station at which either organization will insist only upon its own personnel operating the transmitters. Since it is impossible to give each organization separate transmitting facilities, it is not at present seen how this difficulty will be resolved, if or when it arises.

9. Additionally, the change of command to be effected at [] sometime in December 1953 may completely change the current thinking. In any event we feel that [] has enough equipment at [] or in the pipeline, to take care of any foreseeable contingency.

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Orig: []

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